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Abstract
While many economists have theorized and/or empirically demonstrated that labor−leisure
decisions are influenced by the rate of taxation, this note introduces a new mechanism in
which the collecting of taxes on income may affect such decisions. Although standard
models assume that agents have no preference for the size and scope of government activity,
recent and past political rhetoric suggests that preferences do exist. We examine how
labor−leisure decisions can be affected when taxes are derived from income and agents’
utility functions include a preference for government size.
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1.  Introduction 
In his 1996 State of the Union Address, United States President William J. 
Clinton proudly proclaimed, “the era of big government is over.”  This statement, 
followed by Clinton’s reelection later that year, stands as one of the most memorable and 
defining moments of his presidency.  Clinton would surely not have made such a 
declaration had he felt that his constituents were indifferent to the size and scope of 
government.   
Of course, Clinton’s rhetoric was simply following a longstanding tradition of 
political statesmen to play on a perceived distaste of “big government.”  At his farewell 
address, George Washington stated that “Occupants of public offices love power and are 
prone to abuse it.”  Washington’s contemporary, Patrick Henry, called the U.S. 
Constitution “an instrument for the people to restrain the government—lest it come to 
dominate our lives and interests.”  In “Civil Disobedience,” Henry David Thoreau 
famously noted, “That government is best which governs least.”
1  Eighteenth century 
French philosopher Voltaire said, “A great many laws in a country, like many physicians, 
is a sign of malady.”  More recently, at his first inaugural address Ronald Reagan noted 
that “Government is not the solution to our problems, government is the problem.”  
While many economists, most recently Prescott (2004) and Gentry and Hubbard 
(2004), have theorized or empirically demonstrated that labor supply decisions can be 
influenced by the rate of taxation, this note introduces a new mechanism in which 
taxation may affect labor supply decisions.
2  Though standard labor supply models 
assume that agents are indifferent to the overall size and scope of government activity, 
the aforementioned political rhetoric strongly suggests that the abstract notion of 
“government size and scope” enters, to some degree, into the utility of its citizens.  This 
note develops a model that incorporates preferences for government size and scope into 
agents’ utility functions—where this variable is independent of the taxes the government 
takes or the public goods or services it provides—and shows the role that such 
preferences could play in the labor-leisure decisions of economic agents when taxes are 
derived from income.   
 
2.  Government “Size” and the Labor-Leisure Decision 
  Could a preference for the size and scope of government enter into an agent’s 
labor-leisure decision?  Of course to the extent that “bigger” governments generally 
require additional funding, standard labor supply models already incorporate the notion 
that higher taxes on labor, ceteris paribus, reduce utility and hence can influence an agent 
to choose more leisure.  On the other side of the coin, the tax dollars that flow from 
additional labor can yield enhancements to beneficial government institutions and more 
production of public goods, which, ceteris paribus, increase utility.  Where the model 
developed in this note diverges from past work, however, is that agents have a preference 
for the size and scope of government that goes beyond both the utility that may be gained 
from government goods and services and the potential consumption utility lost from the 
collection of income taxes.   
                                                 
1 This quote has also been attributed earlier to Thomas Jefferson. 
2 See also, for example, Fullerton (1982), Gwartney and Stroup (1983), Haverman 
(1984), Betson and Greenberg (1986), Bosworth and Burtless (1992), and Eissa (1996).   
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It seems clear in the quotes above that Washington, Voltaire, et. al., were 
expressing concerns about large government which were less tangible than simply lost 
consumption from high taxes.  Rather, these statesmen imply that agents have a 
preference for government size and scope for intangible or abstract reasons such as fear 
of lost economic freedoms or simply a dislike of contributing further to the welfare of 
those whom they may view as corrupt, self-interested bureaucrats. What we will call 
“government-loathing” agents—those who think current government size and scope is 
too big—will lose utility from paying taxes levied on labor effort in addition to that 
utility lost simply from forgone consumption of lost income. 
At the same time, what we will call “government-loving” agents—those who 
think government size and scope should be larger—will gain utility which helps offset 
some of the utility lost from forgone consumption.  This effect may be caused by an 
agent’s feeling that his contribution to the tax revenue is going toward an under-funded 
worthy cause.  The agent, for example, may feel that further contributions such as his 
support the government’s ability to provide valuable institutions and public goods and 
perhaps can even help ensure that intangible and subjective notions such as fairness will 
be better attained.   
Perhaps the best way to express this intangible effect on utility is through an 
analogy to charitable giving.  When agents voluntarily give monies to charity, they 
clearly receive disutility from forgone consumption; however, they also receive positive 
utility—albeit for less tangible reasons—from contributing to a cause in which they 
believe. In the case of voluntary contributions, this intangible effect is so strong, in fact, 
that it apparently overwhelms the disutility from forgone consumption. The more the 
agent approves of the mission of the charity, the more “extra utility” he receives.   In the 
case of non-voluntary government contributions through taxes on income, again, it is 
easy to imagine that there is an “extra” utility effect in contributing based on how the 
agent feels about the size and scope of government.  This effect would be positive if the 
agent is government-loving, pushing him, at the margin to work more so as to contribute 
more to government funding.  Or the effect could be negative if the agent is government-
loathing, pushing him, at the margin to work less because of his dislike of paying taxes 
that contribute to a government that he feels is beyond its optimal size and scope. 
One important source of utility from charitable giving is the “warm glow” of 
giving as invoked by Andreoni (1990). Such utility arises from the act of giving and not 
from its impact so it is considered egoistic and not altruistic. Essentially, in the model 
developed in next section, we incorporate the idea behind this “warm glow” utility of 
giving and its opposite, the “cold aversion” disutility of being forced to pay taxes levied 
on income—both of which are separate from the impact giving has on forgone 
consumption of the agent and on any additional public goods the government may 
provide from the extra revenue.  We will focus primarily on the case of “government 
loathing” agents, who face the “cold aversion” of contributing to the government.  Future 
expansions of this research will include more thorough examinations of all cases as well 
as further extensions of the basic model presented here.    
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3.  A Labor Supply Model with a Government Size Preference 
  We begin by assuming that agents have a utility or disutility of supporting the 
government via their “contributions” or taxes, c, and that this effect is independent of the 
associated loss of income or gain from government goods. An agent’s utility is given by   
 
U = U[y(h),l(h),c(h); g* − ga].  
 
The agent chooses h, hours worked, to maximize utility. The independent variables are as 
follows:  
 
Income, y = w·(1 – t)·h;  
 
Leisure, l = K – h;  
 
and “contributions” to the government, c = t·w·h,  
 
where, w = wages, t = constant tax rate on income, and K = constant.
3  
 
The parameters in the utility function are g* for the agent’s ideal government “size” and 
ga for the actual government “size.” Agents can have differing preferences regarding g*. 
Again, what we refer to as “size” of government can be interpreted by agents as the 
magnitude of the government’s budget or the scope of power the government has over the 
economy and society. Naturally, a government of greater proportionate budget size 
generally has greater regulatory scope as well. 
  For simplicity, we assume that the taxes an agent pays have no impact on 
government size, ga, or on the amount of public goods provided, as such an effect will be 
infinitesimally small in societies with large populations.
4 In section four we present a 
case with two real world examples where this assumption is not appropriate and extend 
the model to accommodate such a case.   
  When actual government size, ga, is below an agent’s preferred g* size, let his 
marginal utility of contributing to the government be positive and increasing at a 
decreasing rate.  That is, when ga < g*, agents have ∂U/∂c > 0 and ∂
2U/∂c
2 < 0.  In this 
range agents are “government-loving.”  They prefer a government of larger scope and 
power and hence, at the margin, like contributing to the government, independent of other 
effects.  Naturally, the further ga is below g*, the more positive this “warm glow” or 
“government-loving” effect. 
When actual government size, ga, is above an agent’s preferred g* size, let his 
marginal utility of contributing to the government be negative and decreasing at an 
                                                 
3 We could include a constant for government produced goods in the utility function, but 
as it will have no bearing on the results, we keep the model parsimonious. 
4 This also allows the rationale for a fixed preferred government size. An agent in this 
model cannot influence government size or the amount of public goods so as to increase 
his utility.  Therefore, because those values are given, the agent has a single optimal 
government size, g*. 
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increasing rate.   That is, when ga > g*, agents have ∂U/∂c < 0 and ∂
2U/∂c
2 < 0. In this 
range agents are “government-loathing.”  They prefer a government of smaller scope and 
power and hence, at the margin, dislike contributing to the government, independent of 
other effects. The further ga is above g*, the more negative this “cold aversion” or 
“government-loathing” effect.  We will show that this case can, in fact, lead to a 
backward bending labor supply curve independent of the usual income effects required 
for such a phenomenon.  
Because the second partial derivative is negative regardless of whether ga is above 
or below a specific agent’s g*, we can state that for any given stock of agents’ 
preferences, as ga rises, ∂U/∂c falls (becomes less positive in the government-loving case 
or more negative in the government-loathing case), ceteris paribus.  Therefore, 
independent of all other factors, government size preferences will cause a government of 
larger size and scope to be associated with a more negative (or less positive) aggregate 
effect from such preferences on labor supply.  
  To solve the model, assume an interior solution, and assume the second order 
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Totally differentiating the equation ∂U/∂h = 0 and setting the differentials except dh and 
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  The second order condition for a utility maximum is that ∂
2U/∂h
2 < 0. Therefore, 
to determine the sign of dh/dw, we must determine the sign of ∂
2U/∂h∂w. To do this, 
differentiate equation 2 with respect to w, which gives the following. 
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Here, ∂y/∂w = (1 − t)·h and ∂c/∂w = h·t. Let ∂
2U/∂c∂y = ∂
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  If we divide equation 6 by −∂
2U/∂h
2, the first three terms on the right hand side of 
this equation represent the traditional labor supply curve.  Because ∂
2U/∂y
2 is always 
negative while ∂
2U/∂l∂y can be positive or negative, ∂
2U/∂h∂w can be negative if ∂U/∂y 
is small enough. Therefore, dh/dw can be negative, yielding the well established income-
effects driven backward bending labor supply curve.  
  However, our model with preferences for government size includes two additional 
terms, (∂U/∂c)·t and (∂
2U/∂c
2)·w·t
2·h. For a utility maximum, the latter term must be 
negative, while the marginal utility of supporting the government, ∂U/∂c, can be either 
positive or negative as discussed above. Agents whose ideal government size is smaller 
than the actual government size have ∂U/∂c < 0. Therefore, for these government-
loathing agents, the last two terms in equation 6 must be negative. Thus, independent of 
other effects, preferences over the size and scope of government can make a labor supply 
curve bend backwards. Of course, our intention here is not necessarily to highlight the 
idea of a government size preference driven backward bending labor supply curve, but 
rather, to provide a simple model of the effect that agent’s preferences for government 
size may have on labor-leisure decisions.   
  
4.  An Extension of the Model 
While the model above makes an explicit assumption that an individual agent’s 
tax dollars cannot influence the “size” of government—since at the margin any one 
agent’s changed tax bill from a change in his labor-leisure decision would only 
infinitesimally add to or subtract from the overall size of government—this assumption 
may not be appropriate in all cases. We can allow agents to influence the size of the 
“government” though their labor-leisure decision since the more they work, the more tax 
dollars the government receives.  Rather than simply receiving utility or disutility from 
his contributions to the government, an agent can affect his utility by changing the size of 
government.  Formally, we can let U = U[y(h),l(h),g* − ga(h)]. The actual government 
size becomes ga = g0 + T, where g0 is the absolute government budget size absent the 
given agent’s taxes, T, which are t·w·h.
5
                                                 
5 Note that while we allow the size of government to rise, we do not allow the quantity of 
government produced public goods to which the agent has access to vary.  This 
assumption seems in line with the two examples we cite at the end of this section. Again, 
because the amount of public goods does not vary, an agent faces no tradeoff between 
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  We again assume that agents have an unambiguously diminishing marginal utility 
of contributing to a “bigger” government, which implies ∂
2U/∂(g* − ga)
2 < 0. We also 
assume for the case of ga > g*, whereby agents prefer a smaller government, that ∂U/∂(g* 
− ga) > 0, so that as g* − ga decreases (or ga increases), utility decreases.  In a given 
agent’s utility function, g* and g0 are constants; therefore, we can dispense with them, 
and let U = U[y(h),l(h),−T(h)]. Of course, T is simply analogous to c from the main 
model. Comparing the labor supply results of this utility function to its analog of equation 
6, we have the following for the case of ga > g*. The term ∂U/∂c < 0 above is replaced by 
−∂U/∂T = −∂U/∂(g*−ga) < 0; if the agent works less and pays fewer taxes, the 
government grows smaller, which adds to the agent’s utility. Additionally, ∂
2U/∂c
2 < 0 
above is replaced by ∂
2U/∂(g*−ga)
2 < 0. Essentially, the mathematical results of the new 
utility function replicate the results of the main model and, again, if agents can influence 
the size of the government, preferences for “government size” can make their labor 
supply curves bend backwards independent of other effects.  
Where could such a case with individual agents influencing government size be 
relevant?  Consider a society where the formal government has been largely replaced by 
small-scale private protection rackets.  For example, accounts from Russia circa the year 
2000 suggested that around three-quarters of businesses were “taxed” at rates sometimes 
exceeding half of profits by the Russian mafia in exchange for “protection”—not setting 
fire to the business owner’s property or causing physical harm to the owner or the 
owner’s family.
6  In such a case it is easy to envision individuals and business owners 
encountering clear disincentives to supply labor which go beyond traditional labor supply 
models.  This ability to influence “government size” only strengthens the government 
size preference effect modeled in section three. 
Likewise, dynamics similar to those incorporated in our model may have played a 
role in the labor supply decisions of sharecroppers.  Since the sharecropping farmer had 
to turn over a “taxed” portion of his crop—generally around 50 percent—to the 
landowner, his personal views of the owner certainly played some role in the 
sharecropper’s labor-leisure decisions.  More generally, for any situation in which pay is 
tied to quantity of work, but a portion of that pay goes to a third party, the agent’s views 





The purpose of this note is to provide an initial step for economists to model that 
which seems clear in an increasingly politicized society—people have fundamental 
preferences for the size and scope of government.  These preferences could either 
exacerbate or help offset the disutility they receive from paying taxes and hence can play 
                                                                                                                                                 
utility from government size and utility from public goods, so we can assert that a fixed 
preferred government size exists.   
6 See for example, the testimony of Fritz W. Ermarth, former CIA chief and Russian 
analyst on the National Security Council to the United States House Committee on 
Banking and Finance, September 21, 1999.   
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a role in labor-leisure decisions.  The more an agent dislikes the government, the more 
disutility he gets from having to contribute to it, ceteris paribus.   
To model this effect, we have borrowed from economic models of charitable 
giving such as Andreoni (1990).  Just as contributors to charity receive “extra” utility or a 
“warm glow” from giving that helps offset the forgone loss of income—an effect that 
clearly rises the more the agent approves of the mission of the charity—contributors to 
government will feel a similar effect—either a positive “warm glow” or a negative “cold 
aversion”—on their utility.  Assuming contributions to the government are tied to labor 
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